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also if the trade was a fraudulent trade, I have no doubt that no
action could be maintained."
In Palmer v. Irarris, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 137 (10 P. F.
Smith 156), plaintiff sold cigars, inadc in New York, and used a
label with the words " Golden Crown, L. P. flabana" thereon.
Sometime afterwards defendant began using a somewhat similar
label, on which were the words " Golden Grown, .Fabricade Tabacos
de l,,s .iufjores J'eyas, &c.," and outside the border in small letters
"Ent. according to Act of Congress, A. D. 1858, by Lorin Palmer,
in the ek's office in d't'ct of the S. d't ofN. Y." Defence was that
complainant's tratde-mark was untrue, as his segars were manufactured in New York. An injunction was refued on this ground.
As regarls what is colorable imitation, see the late case of Cope
v. Evans, 30 L. T. R. N. S. 292 (May 2d 1874).
A. S. B.
(To be continted.)
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PI LADELPHIA, WILMINGTON & BALTIMORE RAILROAD CO. v.
STINGER.
The plaintiff was driving a horse known to be afraid of locomotives upon a road
parallel and contiguous to defendants' railroad. The engineer of an approaching
train hlcw the whistle of the locomotive once or twice (there being conflicting evidence on this point), which caused the horse to run off, and the plaintiff was
thercbv thrown from the vehicle and injured.
1hbl, that the question whether the use of the whistle the second time was negligent was for the jury, but not whether any use thereof was such. The nature of
the place and the habit of the company were conclusive that the whistle should be
blown once, and the jury should not have been permitted to say that this was negligence.
Held, further, that the use of a horse known to be afraid of locomotives in the
vicinity of a railroad was contributory negligence.
CASE for negligence.
The narr. contained a single count,

averring that the plaintiff was on September 1st 1871, lawfully
driving his horse and wagon along Gray's Ferry Road, by the side
of which a part of defendants' railroad is situated ; that then and
there the defendants so carelessly and improperly propelled a locomotive and train of cars along their said road, and made such
great noise and shrieks by blowing the whistle of the said locomotive, that by the defendants' carelessness, the plaintiff's horse
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was frightened and ran away, and the plaintiff was thrown from
his wagon and greatly injured. Plea, "Not guilty."
The accident occurred upon Gray's Ferry Road, at a point east
of Gray's Ferry Bridge, which crosses the Schuylkill river some
distance beyond. The locality and character of the road, where
the accident happened, are described in the opinion of the court.
Defendants' sixth point was that if the plaintiff knew that his
horse was easily frightened by locomotives, it was negligence on
his part to drive such a horse along Gray's Ferry Road in close
proximity to the railroad; and if the plaintiff's horse while being
so driven became frightened, he cannot recover.
Answer of the judge below: ["I decline so to' charge you.
The law will not banish horses from highways because locomotives cross or traverse them. The effect of a man having a
horse liable to fright from a locomotive would be to require him to
use a greater degree of care. It would impose upon him the duty
not to bring the horse in contact with an engine unnecessarily;
but here there was no other road. - The law does not compel a man
to go out of his road a mile or more even to avoid such danger.
He must be more watchful. If he approach a railroad with such
a horse, he ought to look out for trains. If he saw a train it
would be his duty to keep out of the way, or, if overtaken on the
route and he should find that the locomotive was upon him, he
should get out and hold the horse by his head; but it is not contributory negligence itself to go there with such a horse. It did
impose a greater degree of caution."]
Verdict for plaintiff and judgment thereon. The defendants took
this writ of error. The answer enclosed in brackets was assigned
for error.
James E. Gowen (with whom was Thomas Hart,Jr.), for plaintiffs in error.-As to the use of steam-whistles, see Wharton on
Negligence, §§ 836, 898; Sh. & Redf. on Negligence, § 466 and
note 1; Burton v. P., W. & B. Railroad Co., 4 Harrington 252;
A. Railroad Co., 2
Bordentown & S. Amb. Turnp. Co. v. C.
30.
B.
&
Ad.
Harrison"314; King v. Pease, 4
Dropsie, contrd, cited -Huyettv. Phila. & Read. Railroad Co.,
11 Harris 374; McIreully v. Clarke, 4 Wright 408; Lack. J;
Bloomsburg Railroad Co. v. Doak, 2 P. F. Smith 31; Tr. &"
Bristol Turnp. Co. v. Phila.& Tr. Railroad Co., 4 P. F. Smith 350.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAXSON, J.-This case presents two questions. The first is,
whether the engineer of the train was guilty of negligence in
blowing the alarm-whistle; the second, whether the plaintiff below
was chargeable with contributory negligence in driving a horse
admitted by him to be afraid of the cars, upon Gray's Ferry Road,
alongside of the railroad, at the time in question.
Negligence has been defined to be the absence of care according to the circumstances: Turnpike Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 P. F.
Smith 345. In some cases the blowing of the steam-whistle of
a locomotive has been held to be negligence; in others the omission
to do so has been treated as negligence. Yet there is no want of
harmony between these apparently conflicting decisions. The
character of the act depends upon the circumstances accompanying
it. Thus, it is clearly the duty of an engineer, when his train
approaches a public highway, if danger is to be apprehended, to
give warning by sounding the whistle, or other sufficient alarm.
The failure to do so would be negligence per se. For while negligence is usually a question of fact for a jury, there are some cases
in which a court can determine what omissions constitute negligence. They are those in which the precise measure of duty is
determinate-the same under all circumstances. Where the duty
is defined, a failure to perform it is, of course, negligence, and may
be so declared by the court: M~c6 1ully v. Clark, 4 Wright 406.
On the other hand, the wanton, and unnecessary sounding of the
whistle has been held to be negligence. Penna. Railroad Co. v.
Barnett, 9 P. F. Smith 259, illustrates both of the views suggested. In that case the engineer of the train, having given no
notice of its approach, blew his whistle under a bridge whilst a
traveller was passing over it, by means whereof his horses took
fright, ran off and injured him. It was held that the omission to
give notice, by whistling or other signal, of the approach of the
train to the bridge, as well as the blowing of the whistle while the
engine was under the bridge, there being no opparent necessity
therefor, was properly left to the jury as evidence of negligence.
The plaintiffs in error, having a right under their charter to
propel their cars by the use of steam, are not to be held responsible in damages for injuries resulting from the proper use of such
an agency. It was held in The Turnpike Co. v. The Railroad Co.,
before cited, that , loss of property adjacent to a railroad from

P., W. & B. RAILROAD CO. v. STINGER.

the sparks of a locomotive, apart from misuse, is damn urn absque
injuria. It was said by the present Chief Justice, in delivering
the opinion of the court in that case, "the law, in conferring the
right to use an element of danger, protects the person using it,
except for the abuse of his privilege." It may, therefore, be
safely assumed that the company are not liable for injuries resulting from the use of their cars where due care is exercised. The
noise of a rapidly moving train, as well as the. sound of the
whistle, may alarm a horse and cause an accident. Whether such
accident imposes a liability upon the company to make compensation in damages, must depend to a great extent upon the fact
whether it was the result of a want of proper care on the part of
the persons in charge of such train.
What is proper care cannot be determined by any fixed rule of
law. It must depend upon the facts of the particular case. That
which would be due care in running a train through a sparsely
settled, rural district, might be negligence, if not actual recklessness, in approaching a large city. The steam-whistle is one of
the recognise~d methods of signalling the approach of a train. Its
universal use upon railroads is a strong argument in favor of its
efficiency. It is shrill and piercing; can be heard for a great
distance, and can be mistaken for nothing else. Yet it has disadvantages. More than all other sounds, it is a terror to animals
-unaccustomed to its warning. Where trains are passing through
the built-up portions of towns and cities, it is not needed or often
used. In such cases they move slowly, and the ringing of a bell
sufficiently answers the purposes of an alarm, and is not so
likely to frighten horses. But where it is necessary to warn crossings or bridges at a distance in advance of the train, no sufficient
substitute has yet been found for the whistle. It can be heard in
any condition of wind and weather. In the absence of the discovery of any suitable substitute, and in view of its use upon all
roads operated by steam, the mere fact of the whistling furnishes
no presumption of negligence. Was the whistle used in such a
wanton manner as to amount to negligence ? The learned judge
left this question to the jury, and in so far he was right. But he
also left it for the jury to decide whether the use of the whistle at
all in that particular place was negligence. The train had passed
beyond the .closely built-up portion of the city, which ended at
Twenty-eighth street, and there were but few houses between that
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point and Gray's Ferry Bridge. The engineer whistled about
Thirtieth street. The plaintiff says he whistled twice; that the
first whistle frightened his horse, and it commenced to run; that
just as he was getting it under control there was a second "blast"
from the whistle, and his horse then became unmanageable, threw
him out, and the wagon passed over him. Gray's Ferry Road
and the railroad at this point are side by side. The train and the
plaintiff were going in the same direction, and at the moment when
the accident occurred the train had nearly overhauled him. It
was a disputed fact whether the whistle was sounded once or twice
in this vicinity. The conductor, engineer and fireman of the train,
and other witnesses for the company, testify that there was but one
whistle west of Twenty-eighth street. Nor is the plaintiff sustained by any of his own witnesses as to the second whistle.
If the court below had left the jury to find negligence from the
use of the whistle the second time, if they believed it to have been
so used, provided the engineer saw, or with proper care might
have seen the plaintiff's wagon, and that his horse was becoming
unmanageable, there would have been no error. But he submitted
the case to the jury in such a way as left them at liberty to find
negligence from the use of the whistle once at or about Thirtieth
street. It-must be borne in mind that the Philadelphia, Wilnington and Baltimore Railroad runs along Washington Avenue in
this city until it reaches a point opposite to the United States
Arsenal, situated on the west side of Gray's Ferry Road, between
Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh streets. It there turns, enters
upon the company's grounds alongside of the Gray's Ferry Road,
and runs parallel with that road a short distance from it, and several feet above its grade, to the bridge over the Schuylkill river.
The road makes several curves, one at the Arsenal, another just
east of Twenty-eighth street, and the third half a square beyond
Thirty-first street. These curves are all so decided that the road
can be seen for a short distance only beyond them ; the Gray's Ferry
Bridge and the last two road-crossings being invisible until the
last curve has been passed, a point above Thirty-second.street.
Between Twenty-eighth street and the Schuylkill there are four
road-crossings over the railroad, the bridge being about three
squares beyond the last crossing. The bridge is a drawbridge, a
watchman being stationed at each end for the purpose of flagging
the trains, upon being warned by the whistle of their approach.
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It was the daily practice to blow the whistle at Thirtieth street.
The rules of the company required it. We have seen that there
were several-crossings, as well as the bridge-tender, to be warned
of the approaching train. They were invisible by reason of the
curves. The engineer had the right, under the circumstances, to
blow the whistle in the vicinity of Thirtieth street sufficiently to
give notice of the approach of the train. Its use once, in the
ordinary manner, was not evidence of negligence, and it ought
not to have been submitted to the jury as such. On the contrary,
had he omitted to give such warning, and by reason thereof the
plaintiff had been struck and injured by the train, we should have
been compelled to say, under the authority of our own cases, that
such omission was negligence per se.
It was urged that any use of the whistle at this point was unnecessary, and the fact that it has since been abandoned was stated
as str6ng evidence in support of this view. The abandonment,
however, was doubtless due in a great measure to the changed
circumstances. This locality has been much improved since 1871,
and there are many more houses there now than formerly. We
have held these corporations to a strict line of responsibility for
the failure to give sufficient warning of the approach of their trains
at road-crossings. It would not be just to them, nor perhaps safe
to the travelling public, for us now to criticise too closely the preCise amount of noise employed in giving the needed warning at
such places, or the means of producing it.
There was also error in the answer of the learned judge to the
defendant's sixth point. It is true, the law will not banish horses
from the highways. It is equally clear that the plaintiff had a
right to drive this particular horse, or any other horse, however
vicious, upon the Gray's Ferry Road, at this particular point of
danger. We are not dealing with the absolute rights of the parties. The question here is one of prudence and care. Where a man
drives an unbroken or vicious horse, or one that is easily frightened
by a locomotive, along a public road running side by side with a
railroad, and liable, to be met or overtaken by a train, he does so
at 1Hs own risk. It is an act amounting to recklessness. That
there was no other road for the plaintiff to use does not matter.
There were other horses which he might have procured for use in
such a dangerous locality. Duties and obligations are mutual.
The railroad company had as high a right to move their trains
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upon their road as the plaintiff had to drive his horse along Gray's
Ferry Road. Both were bound to the exercise of care in accordance with the circumstances of the case.
We do not lose sight of the fact that in such questions as this
the interests of other parties are concerned. The right of a man
to risk his own life, and that of his horse, may be conceded ; but
not the right by an act of negligence, if not of recklessness, to
place in peril the lives of hundreds of others who may happen to be
travelling in a train of cars.
What we have said disposes of the third and sixth assignments
of error. The remaining assignments are carved out of the two
just mentioned, and do not need more specific notice.
The j udginent is reversed, and venire facias do novo awarded.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. LEWIS

ET

UX.

A boy over eight years of age was sent on an errand by his mother, which reHe took a short cut along the track, and
was overtaken and killed by a train going in the same direction. The place
where the boy was killed'was within the limits of a city, and the train was moving
at a rate of speed between eighteen and twenty-five miles an hour.
Beld, that the question of contributory negligence in the parent and child was
for the jury, and that the same amount of care could not be demanded from a child
as from an adult.
Held, further, that regard must be had to the habits, character, condition and
circumstances of people living in a city and along the line of a railroad, in ascertaining what degree of care is necessary in running trains upon the outskirts of a
city, and that an admitted trespass upon the road would not necessarily bar an
action for damages.

quired him to cross a railroad track.

CASE to recover damages caused plaintiffs by the death of their
minor son. Plea, "Not guilty."
Upon the trial the plaintiffs' evidence was, in substance, as follows: The plaintiffs resided on the line of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, near Harrisburg, one quarter of a mile below and to the
east of the Lochiel Mills. On November 22d 1869, Mrs. Lewis,
the mother of the deceased, sent the deceased, a boy of eight and
a half years, on an errand. A wagon road ran along the side of
the track till it came to the Mills, where two ways were open to the
boy; he might go on up the railroad, or he might make a circuit
round the mill, a way which was twice as long as the other. Just
Vo.. XXIII.-84
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at the mill there was a private crossing belonging to the Mill Company, and used for hauling sand, &c. Below the mill, to the east,
was a curve, and between the tracks, above the mill to the west,
there was- a plank footway, used by the employee* in going to and
from their homes, most of which were a little way up the railroad.
The boy stepped on the up-track going west, at this crossing, and
while his attention was attracted by a train coming towards the
east on the down-track, he started to walk up the track. Having
gone fifteen feet up the track from the crossing, he was struck by
a train going west, thrown upon the other track, and run over
and killed by the train coming east. A workman upon the roadside testified that the up-train, which was the "morrin g mail," was
running at the rate of twenty to twenty-five miles an hour.
The plaintiffs then offered to put in evidence an ordihance of
the city of Harrisburg, passed in 1862, limiting the speed of trains
to seven miles an hour. This was objected to, on the ground that
in 1862 the locus of the accident was outside of the city limits.
This offer the court below refused.
The plaintiffs also offered to show that a large number of persons were in the habit of walking upon the track in this locality.
Offer refused.
#
The defendants' testimony was, ii; substance, as follows: The
engineer, as he rounded the curve, saw the boy coming down from
the mill towards the railroad. When first seen, he was forty or
fifty feet ahead, and when he stepped upon the track he was but
five or six yards from the engine. The engineer immediately blew
the whistle and put on the brakes, but the sudden jerk broke the
chain. The boy was struck about fifteen feet above the crossing.
The engineer had turned off the steam several hundred yards
below, and testified that he was running from fifteen to eighteen
miles an hour. There was also evidence that even had the chain
not broken, the train could not have been stopped in time to prevent the accident, and that even the air-brake, which was not then
invented, would not have changed the result.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs ; to which the defendants took a writ of error.
Hall and Jordan, for plaintiffs in error.-A parent has no right
to allow a child to be in a position where he will be likely to
run into danger: Glassey v. Bailroad Co., 7 P. F. Smith 172;
.Hummel v. Railroad Co., 8 Wright 375. The boy was where he
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had no right to le : Railral (;o. v. ,p)earen, 11 'Wright .300.
Individuals have no greater rights at private crossings than anywhere else on the track: .ick'ol.am v. lrie Railroad Co., 41 N.
Y., 2 Hand 575. It has never been held that running a train at
any rate of speel is, per se, evidence of negligence: Slearnan
and Redfield on 'Negligence, p. 535 ; Wilds v. Railroad C,,.. 29
N. Y. 315.
Ovid F. Tohnson (with whom was r. Airicks), contr&.-The
question of niegligence in the parents was properly for the jury :
Raiboad CJo. v. Armstrong, 2 P. F. Smith 282. It is not 1per se
negligence to send out a, boy eight years old without a protector
.brew v. Railroa, (o., 26 N. Y. 49 ; Lovett v. Railroad Co., 9
Allen 56 ); Jiail,'oad (Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 372. The jury alone
can determine whether a particular rate of speed is negligence in
a particular locality : Railroad Co. v. Long, 25 P. F. Smith 259.
Contributory negligence cannot be determined as a question of law:
Railroad Co. v. HIol'lwee, 17 P. F. Smith 311 ; Railroad Co. v.
Ackerman, 24 I(. 265 ; O'3_ara v. Railroad CJo., 38 N. Y. 445;
Beers v. lRailroad Co., 19 Conn. 566.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, C. J.-This case was submitted to the jury correctly
and fairly. In the first place the judge withdrew from the jury
all the evidence that the public were accustomed to use the track
at or in the neighborhood of the place of the accident, as a passageway by sufferance of the railroad company ; saying also that the
company " is just as much entitled to the free and uninterrupted
enjoyment of its track at this particular place as at any other
along the entire line of the road." ie also informed the jhry,
"that if this boy was walking on the track of this road, taking it
as a short cut to his aunt's, he was where he had no right to he;
and it matters not that many others had done the same; this did
not justify this boy, nor could it justify the father and mother in
using this track as a footway."
Ile then fairly left the great question of the cause to the jury in
fitting terms ; that is, whether the train was "1running at a safe
and prudent rate of speed ;" or (said he) "was the rate at which
the train was approaching and running dangerous and reckless."
Again, "if you find that defendants' train was running at the
usual rate of speed and not at a reckless and dangerous rate, but
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with proper care and caution, upon a good track, with the best
brake then known, and with a due regard-and by this I mean
with that regard that a prudent man would have-for the protection
of human life, under the circumstances of the case, then we say to
you that the plaintiffs cannot recover, and your verdict should be
for the defendants." Surely this was not exacting an unjust or
illegal degree of care and caution of the company entering within
the outer limits of the city of Harrisburg where the accident happened. It took place atthe Lochiel Iron Works; situated immediately alongside of the track, where numerous hands were constantly
passing and repassing, and in the vicinity of the rows of houses
occupied by the hands employed in these large -works, and in a
neighborhood where many persons were likely to be. According
to the plaintiffs' evidence, the rate of speed of the train while approaching and entering within these limits was from twenty to
twenty-five miles an hour. The engineer himself testified to
eighteen miles, and it was shown that before the coroner's jury he
had testified that the speed was from twenty to twenty-five miles
an hour. There was therefore evidence which justified the instructions, and this distinguishes the case, at once, from that of The
Railroad Co. v. ffummel, 8 Wright 375, in which Justice STRONG
says, the cars were moving slowly by their own gravity, yet so
perfectly under the control of the engineer that they could be immediately stopped. The question presented in this case is, therefore, whether a railroad company may enter into the outskirts of a
populous, city at a high and dangerous rate of speed, even though
it be upon its own track where the people have no right to be.
He would be without much feeling for his kind, and wedded to
technical rights to an unwarranted extent, who could affirm this
proposition ; and thus leave a people unprotected by law, and subject to whatever danger any motive of interest or otherwise might
lead to in the use of a high and dangerous rate of speed. The
Railboad Co. v. ltummel, supra, asserts the rights of a railroad
company upon its own track, as thoroughly as any case to be found
in the books, and even there it is said, "ordinary care they must
be held to." Is it common prudence or ordinary care to run into
tne outskirts of a city at a rate of speed so bigh and reckless that
persons happening on the track are liable at any moment to be
overtaken and crushed to death? Conceding that these people
are trespassers, yet must we have no regard to the habits, character,
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condition, and circumstances of a people living in a city and immediately on the line of a railroad? Clearly to disregard them
would be contrarv to our sense of humanity, and to that common
judgment of mankinul expressed in the makira "sic ?tere tuo, ut
alienurn non lamdas," and that rule of right doing, which requires
men to do unto others as they would have others to do unto themselves. But bevond this there is also that supervising authority
of the state, which, by its police powers, is enabled to regulate
even positive rights, when it is necessary for the safety, protection,
and welfare of the people. Hence it has been held that the speed
of trains through towns and cities may be regulated by municipal
ordinances : Railroad Co. v. James et ux., 1 Phila. Weekly Notes
68. But the absence of any such positive regulation does not
leave the way open to a railroad company to run its trains into a
populous town at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed. Are the
circumstances of the case not to be heeded, and are the people, regardless of the probability of the loss of life, to be run down and
crushed to death merely because they happen to be trespassers ?
Does no duty rest upon a railroad company, because it is running
upon its own track, unfenced and unguarded? Surely we must
not disregard the habits, character and condition of a people, accustomed to run thoughtlessly and unheedingly into danger. We
must take into account the feebleness of age and helpless infancy,
tile infirmity of mind and body of many living on a railroad track,
their want of reflection and unthinking heedlessness, their want
of apprehension of danger, and entire absence of injury they suppose they do to the track of a railroad ; the many motives they
have to do an act which, though a trespass, is seemingly to them
no cause of complaint. Surely, the courts have not lost their
power to declare what is ordinary prudence and care in the use of
its track by a railroad company merely because the track is its
own, and no one may rightfully trespass there. The circumstances
which qualify this right must be taken into account and submitted
to a jury under proper instructions. It is said this is to submit
the company to the influence of prejudice, and that juries are
always unfivorable. The causes of this prejudice it is not proper
to discuss, but tile common sense of mankind is not often very far
wrong. Not to submit circumstances to a jury upon the evidence,
and under the controlling power of a court, is simply to set aside
the trial by jury. *Whether the population is dense or sparse at
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the locus in quo, what is the likelihood of danger, and vhat the
rate of speed compatible with the public safety under the circumstances, -are facts which necessarily find their way into the jurybox. When it is thus determined that the rate of speed is incompatible with public safety, upder the circumstances of the place,
the rights of the company, even upon its own track, are qualified
by the great law of the public good. Life is too sacred to become
the sport of chance, or the sacrifice of heedless will. " Salus
populi est supreina lex." "N'ecessitas vincit leyem .etquod cogit,
defendit."
We !fold, therefore, there was no error in the instruction of the
court in this respect. This being the case, there cannot be any
serious objection to the charge upon the other questions in the
cause as to contributory negligence either on the part of the boy
or his parents. Referring to the unlawful act of the boy in being
upon the track, the judge said: " And if the boy in so doing had
sufficient judgment and discretion to know the danger he was running, and did not exercise the ordinary care that one of his age
and maturity should, he was guilty of such negligence, concurring
to an accident, as would prevent him from recovering against the
company because he was a wrongdoer-a trespasser-and did not
guard against the injury as he might have done. And if lie could
not recover, under the same conditions, if the accident resulted in
his death, the plaintiffs cannot recover; for his negligence-the
negligence of the son, servant, the agent-is imputable to the
plaintiffs themselves when they ask to recover damages for an injury to their son, which was occasioned by an accident to which
his own negligence contributed."
As to the negligence of the
mother herself, the court affirmed the fourth point of the defendants leaving the facts to the jury, and this fully covered the ground
in connection with the answers to the third and fifth points of defendants. Finding no error, the judgment is affirmed.
I.
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such a crossing, the train must be so
used as not to be dangerous to those
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proper and what is allimproper use out allowing him the full benefit of this
must generally depend upon the circuin- presumption."
In Railroad v. Ogier, 35 Penna. St.
Stances of the ca-e. and is then for tile
63, a train of cars was running at
jury. In Rail,'od v. James and lJ' fe,
I Weekly Notes 68, a child of eighteen
mouths old was killed in tilelimits
of the city of Allegheny, by a train
running at the rate of twenty-five or
thirty miles an hoar, according to the
plaintiff's testimony.
An ordinance
was at tile
time it, force, passed in pursuance of an Act of Assembly prohibiting the running of trains in that
city at a greater rate than five miles an
hloutr, and without cau.,ing a bell to be
rung. The court below charged that if
the accident had been caused by the
negligence of the defendant in disobeying the ordinance, tle plaintiffs (the
child's parents) if not guilty of contributory negligence, could recover; that
tle child was too young to be itself
guilty of negligence, but that if its
presence on the track was owing to tle
parents' carelessness, or if the accident
were unavoidable even if the ordinance
had been obeyed, there could be no recovery. Tihe Supreme Court (of Pennsylvania) aflirmed the judgment, saying
that in the excreie of police power the
city had the right to regulate tite run-ning of trains even on tile private property of tile defendant. In Reeres v.
Railroad, 30 Penna. St. 454, a railroad cros~ed at grade a turnpike, and
some cattle in being driven across the
lines were rtn down and killed by
the locomotive.
" Without."
says
WOODWAUD, J., "lavitng
down any
general rule as to tile nanner in which
that crossing or similar ones should be
approached, the engineer was bound, in
ilte cireumstances of the case, to approach it at a perfiectly manageable rate
of speed, and what lie was bound to do
the plaintiff had a right to presume
would be done. And tle measures of
precaution taken or omitted by the plaintiff, cannot be properly estimated with-

tle rate of twenty-live miles an hour.
The plaintiffs decedent was run into
anti killed in driving across the lines
which crossed the road where lie was,
at grade. The question of negligetce
arising from tile rate of speed at which
the train was approaching the crossing,
was held to have been properly left to
tile
jury. It was also held to have been
the duty of the defendant's servants to
give a signal of tlte approach of the
train to a road crossing at such time
and in such manner as to le a timely
and sufficient
warning to the passengers
upon the road : lRailroad Co. v. Long,
75 Penna. St. 257; see also Wharton
on Negligence,
803.
(2.) Abuse in, or neglect of, Whistling.
-In Railroadv. Barnett, 59 Penna. St.
259, the plaintiff was driving across a
bridge which ran over a railroad, and
an engine passing under the bridge
whistled. The horses took fright and
the plaintiff was injured. " Whether,"
"
says W LLIA S, J.,
it is the duty of
tle company to give notice of the approach of its trains at any point on the
road, depends altogether upon circumstances. Where there is no reasonable
apprehension of danger no such notice
is required, lint if danger to tile
person
or property of others may le reasonably apprehended, or is likely to result
frot the running of its trains without

giving such notice, then it is the duty
of the company to give it, and its omission is negligence. Tile court therefore
was clearly right insaying that it was
the duty of the company to give notice
wherever danger may rc.ult to persons
rightfully travelling oti a public road
that crosses the track, whether at grade,
or over or utder the railroad, where
danger would ie the consequence of
4
want of notice. * * * If under the evi-
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dence in the case the court had charged
as matter of law that the company was
guilty of no negligence in not giving
notice of the'approach of the train, the
instruction would have been clearly erroncous. * * * The court properly
charged that the jury should determine
whether it was not the duty of the engineer to give some notice of the approach of the train, and that this was a
matter of fact, in view of all the surroundings, and not of law."
In Railroad v. Whilten, 13 Wall.
276, tile deceased had died from injuries
received from a locomotive of the railroad company while crossing its trackat grade in Janesville, Wis. The locomotive was backing in an opposite direction to that' of a freight train which
had just passed. There was a conflict
of evidence as to whether the bell of the
locomotive was rung at the time of tile
injury. The court charged that it was
tlhe duty of the engineer to ring the
bell for a sufficiently long time before
crossing the street, to give warning to
any passengers, and to keep it ringing
till the tender had crossed the street.
This. was held a proper instruction, by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Railroad v. Payne, 59 Ill. 534,
there was evidence that the crossing
was of a dangerous character, and that
the defendants ran the train on a down
grade with comparative noiselessness,
without sounding their whistle or ringing the bell. These facts were held
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding
a verdict for the plaintiff.
See also Rothe v. Railroad, 21 Wis.
256 ; Biilby v. Railroad, 18 C. B. N. S.
584, and Railroad v. Garveg, 58 Ill.
83.
And in Artz v. Railroad, 34
Iowa 153, where it was impossible for
the person to see, and difficult for him
to hear, an approaching train, near a
crossing at grade, " It would be the
clear duty," says CoLE, J., "of a railroad company to ring the bell or sound
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the whistle, so as to warn persons of
the approach of the train, and an omission to so do, even in the absence of
any statute requiring it, would be negligence if so found by the jury, rendering the company liable for any injury
resulting therefrom.
In Railroadv. Ackerman, 74 Penna.
St. 265, the plaintiff's driver stopped
about two steps from the crossing at
grade. The state of the atmosphere
and some obstructions prevented his
seeing for any considerable distance.
There was evidence that the train was
moving more rapidly than was allowable
by the city ordinance. There was a
conflict of testimony in regard to the
ringing of tle bell. "If," says SuAnsWOOD, J., " the evidence given by the
plaintiff is to be believed, the railroad
company in the case before us was
guilty of very gross negligence. They
sounded no whistle, and if they were
ringing a bell it could only have been
at intervals; not continuously. (The
driver of the wagon) stopped within ten
steps of the crossing and listened, but
heard nothing. If he had got out and
led his horses on the track the result
would have probably been the loss of
his own life as well as that of the
horses. * * * It is negligence in a railroad company to have such a crossing
so obstructed as this one appears to
have been. * * * As to streets in a city,
there should be a flagman at every
crossing."
Tile judge below had left it to the
jury to say whether the servant of the
plaintiff had done all that a cautious,
prudent man could do. This was held
to be a question of fact for the jury.
See Afaginnis v. Railroad, 52 N. Y.
215.
That the use of the steam-whistle
on a locomotive is not perse negligence,
see People v. Cunningham, 3 Denio
524 ; Railroad v. Jones, 3 Campbell
230; Jones v. Railroad, 107 Mass. 261 ;
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Congrcre v. Sinith, 18 N. Y. 75 ; Congrere V. Mlorgan, Id. 84; Morton v.
M11oore, 15 Gray 573.
As to the u-e of steam-whistles in
factories, see AKdiit v. Goodilear'sGlobe
Co., 38 Conn. 438, and Railroad v.

Dunm, 61 111. 385.
As to the negligent use of tie whistle
by the rairoad company where a horse
has been frightened, occasioning an accident, see $neesbi; v.

Rtilroad, Law

Rep. 9 Q. B. 263; Rhilroad v. Barnett,
supra ; Railroad v. F,'ullerlon, 14 C. B.
N. S. 54; Railroad v. Hirmon, 47 11.
298 ; 1ill v. Railroad, 55 Maine 438.
As to the use and abuse of steamwhistles as signals, see the very interesting report of the Massachusetts Railroad Comnissioners, in the Boston
Daily Advertiser of July 24th 1874,
quoted in Wharton on Negligence, note,
804.
As to the omission to use a signal of
warning, see Bemis v. Railroad, 42 Vt.
375 ; Trout v. Railroad, 23 Grat. 619.
The defendant, however, can show that
the injury was not caused by their
omission : Railroad v. Bibb, 37 Ala.
699 ; lfowenstein v. Railroad, 55 Mo.
33.
I.

CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE.

(1.) I
rneral.-The question of
contributory negligence is ordinarily one
of mixed law and fact, and wherever it
depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case should be submitted to
the jury. Wts.LtAN.S, J., in Railroad
v. McElwee, 67 Penna. St. 315, says,
" The law is well setiled that what is
and what is not negligence in a particiilar caqe is generally a question for the
jury and not for the court. It is always
a question for the jury when the measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable
care. In such case the measure of duty
is not fixed, but variable. Under some
circumstances a higher degree of care is
demanded than under others, and when
VOL. XXIII.-85

the standard shifts with the circumstances of the case, it is in its very nature incapable of being determined as a
matter of law, and must be submitted
to the jury to determine wlat it is, and
whether it has been complied with."
See Mr. Francis Rawle's note to Lewis
v. Railroad 13 American Law Register N. S. 288. In Railroad V. Beale, 73
Penna. St. 504, SimAB.swOOD J., says,

' There never was a more important
principle settled than that the fact of the
failure to stop immediately before crossing a railroad track is not merely evi"dence of negligence for the jury but
negligence per se and a question for
the court. (Railroad v. HIrlemaii, 13
Wright 60.) It was important, not so
much to railroad companies as to the
travelling public. Collisions of this
character have often resulted in the loss
of hundreds of valuable lives of passengers on trains, and they will do so again
if travellers crossing railroads are not
taught their simple duty, not to themselves only, but to others." In this
case, the deceased in crossing a railroad
at grade had almost come to a full stop,
listened, and heard no train.
The
judge below had charged that if there
was any point along the road on which
the deceased was driving, before he
struck the railroad, from which he
could have seen or heard the approach
of the train if lie had stopped, it was his
duty to have done so, and if lie did not
so stop there could be no recovery. A
verdict having been given for the plaintiff, the judgment was reversed, on the
ground that the court should have held
the conduct of the deceased to be, per se,
contributory negligence. See Railroad
v. Akernian, suqn'a.
There is some doubt as to whether
the plaintiff, can recover where lie or
his decedent has been guilty of any
negligence whatever. The better opinion is that if the negligence has not
directly contributed to the accident he
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can do so, and whether it has or not is
for the jury.
But in Potter v. Railroad, 21 Wise.
377, it is said, that, "Negligence, proximate or contributory to the injury, however slight, prevents recovery."
In
commenting upon this case, Dixox, C.
J., in l'ard v. Railroad,29 Wisc. 144,
says, " If by this is understood, as was
doubtless intended, any negligence or
omission, however slight, to use ordinary care, or a slight want of such care
contributing to the injury, the expression
is quite right, and no correction is required, but tile
language is not adapted
to convey this idea with accuracy."
See also, Dreher v. The Town, 6-c., 22

said, that '"When there has been mutual
negligence, and thq negligence of each
party was the proximate cause of tle
injury, no action whatever can be sustained. In tile
use of the words ' proximate cause,' is meant negligence at the
time the injury happened. In such
case no action can be sustaindd by
either, for tile
reason that as there can
be no apportionment of damages there
callbe no recoverv. So where the
negligence of the plaintiff is proximate,
and that of the defendant is remote, or
consisting in some tilier matter than
what occurred out of the injury, in such
case no action call
be sustained, for the
reason that the imnediate cause was the
Wise. 675; Railroad v. Stalhaan, 21
act of the plaintiff himself:" Rill v.
Ohio St. I ; Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Penna. Mlarr(-n, 2 Stark. 377; Munroe v. Peach,
St. 441, where READ, J., quotes with 7 Mete. 274 ; Parker v. Adams, 12
approval the following language by Mete. 415 ; Brownellv. Flagler, 5 Iill
WOODWARD, J., 12 Harris 469 : "It
282 ; Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Ilill 592;
is an incontestable principle that where
W|illiams v. IHolland, 6 C. & P. 23.
the injury complained of is the produc" On the other hand, when the neglition of mutual or concurring negligence
gence of tle defendant is proximate
no action for damages will lie. The and that of the plaintiff remote, tile
parties being mutually in fault, there can action can then well be su!-tained,
be no apportionment of the damages.
although tileplaintiff is not entirely
The law has no scales to determine in
without fault. This seems to he now
such cases whose wrongdoing weighed settled in England and in this country.
most in the compound that occasioned Therefore, if there be negligence on tile
the mischief." Theformer judge adds, part of the plaintiff, yet if at the time
"The question presented to the court when the injury was committed it might
or the jury is not one of comparative have been avoided by the defendant in
negligence between the parties, nor does the exercise of reasonable care and pruvery great negligence on the part of a dence, an action will lie for the injury.''
defendant so operate to strike a balance
See also Kerwhacker v. Railroad, 3
of negligence as to give a judgment to Ohio St. 172 ; Railroadv. State, 29 INd.
a plaintiff whose own negligence con- 553 ; Railroad v. Trainer, 33 Md. 342.
tributes in any degree to the injury."
This principle was also maintained in
See Wilds v. Railroad, 24 N. Y. 432;
Steel v. Burkhardt, 104 'ass. 59, where
Railroad v. Miller, 25 Mich. 277.
CH ArNtAs,
C. J., after citing lllch v.
In the principal case, supra, it is
Weston. 6 Gray 505; Greg9 v. llyiaan,
distinctly held, that the fact that the 4 Cushing 322 ; IlMa v. oster, 1 Allen
pla.ntiffs' decedent was where he had 408, and Spqflord v. larlow, 3 Allen
no right to be, was not a necessary 176, says : " It is true generally that
bar to his recovery, priovided it did while no person can maintain an action
not directly contribute to the disaster. to which lie nust trace his title through
In True v. Railroad, 24 Vt. 497, it is his own breach of tle law, yet the fact
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that he is breaking the law does not
leave him remediless for injuries wilfully or carclesqly done to him, and to
which his own conduct has not contributed.''
See also Lane v. Atlantic
Works, 107 Mass. 104; Britton v.
hnhab., 107 Mass. 347;
ibbard v.
Thompson, 109 Mass. 288.
In Ishell v. Railroad, 27 Conn. 404,
it is said, "A remote fault in one party
does not of course dispense with care in
the other. It may even make it more
necessary and important if thereby a
calamitous injury canl be avoided, or an
unavoidable calamity essentially mitigated. A my enters a door-yard to
find his hall or arrow, or to look at a
flower in the garden, and is bitten and
lacerated by a vicious bull-dog; still lie
i. a trespasscr, and if lie had-kept out
would have received no hurt ; nevertlieless is not the owner of tile dog liable?
A perion is hunting in the woods of a
stranger or across the pasture of his
ineighhor, and is wounded by a concealed
gun, or his (log is killed by some con(caled instrument, or lie is himself gored
by an enraged bull. Is lie in all those
ea-es remnediless because lie is there without consent ? *
Some [of the cases
quoted] and especially those from the
New York reports, if we understand
them, are at variance not only with our
own law but with the common law of
England."
"As a rule we may say that a person is not chargeable with contributory
negligence who, when unwarned peril
comes on him suddenly acts wildly and
madly." Wharton on Negligence,
304, citing Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13
Peters 181 ; .Ruell v. Railroad, 31 N.
Y. 314 ; Railroad v. Yarwood, 17 III.
509 ; .'ohnson v. Railroad, 70 Penna.
St. 357 ; Coulter v. Express Co., 5
Lansing 67. For an illustration of the
rule that the injury must have been occasioned solely by the deftndant's fault,
and without any negligence on the part

of, the plaintiff, in order to render the
former liable, see Moody v. Osgood, 60
Barb. (N. Y.) 644.'
(2.) Of Parent and Child.-In a suit
by the parent for the loss of service of
a child, the former's contributory negligence would be a bar to the action, and
that fact is a proper question for the
jury: Railroad v. Pearson, 72 Penna.
St. 169. " We agree," says SEARSWOOD, J., "that to say it is negligence
to permit a child to go out and play
without a grown attendant, would be to
hold that free air and exercise should
only be enjoyed by the wealthy, who
are able to employ such attendants, and
would amount to adenial of those blessings to the poor :" Kay v. Railroad,65
Penna. St. 277 was al action by the
child in which the negligence of the
parent would perhaps be no defence.
See also Railroad v. Long, 75 Penna.
St. 257. " We disagree emphatically,"
says Chief Justice AGNEW, in the last
case, " to the position taken by the
learned counsel for the railroad company, that the rate of speed at the time
was not material, and that seven or
eight miles an hour is a rate of speed
compatible with safety in passing
through the streets of a populous town.
While it is true that trains must be run
at a high rate of speed to reach their
greatest utility, populous towns and
cities must be exceptions, where the
speed must be moderated in view of the
danger of life, limb and property; where
the people and the trains have a common
right to be, and have a joint use of the
highway, the rights of each must be regarded."
In this case it was left to the jury to
say whether the mother of the deceased,
an infant less than two years and two
months old, had suffered it to wander
on the street, with the instruction that
if she had done so the parents of the
child could not recover. Held, that
this was right. Where, however, the
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suit is brought by the child, the decisions

cising discretion it is for the jury to

differ as to whether the negligence of
the parent is a bar to recovery. That
it is not, see Berge v. Gardiner, 19

say whether in the particular ease it
was guilty of negligence, paying attention to the rule that less care is to
be expected from a child than from an
adult. In Railroad v. Snyder, IS Ohio
St. 414, WVF.Lsu, J., qotes from
Railroad v. Mahoney, supra, the following language of the court below.
"To a child of the plaintiff's years
no contributory negligence can be imputed. She is not precluded from recovering against one joint tort-feasor by
showing that others hve borne a share
in it." The child was Four years of
age. See Karr v. Parke, 40 Cal. 193;
Cosgro'e v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255;
Lorett v. Railroad, 9 Allen 357 ; Sclhirfield v. Railroad, 40 Cal. 447 ;
lfisld
v. Railroad, 14 N. Y. 310 ; Drew v.
Railroad, 26 N. Y. 49 ; Coomabs v.
New Bedford Co., 102 Mass 572;
Grizzle v. Frost, 3 F. & F. 622; Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGnire, 3 M1acq.
300; Railroad v. Gladman, 15 Wallace
401 ; Railroad v. Stout, 17 Wallace
657; Costello v. Railroad, 65 Barb. 92 ;
Reynolds v. Stout, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
644.
(3.) Of Trespasser.-See the language above quoted in Isbell v. Railroad,
27 Conn. 404. In State v. Railroad,
52 N. II. 528, SARSGExT, J., quotes
with approval from Norris v. Litrlyjitld,
35 N. II. 271, where it is said that,
"The fact that the plaintiff is a trespasser or violator of the law does not of
itself discharge another from tile
observance of due and proper care toward him,
neither would it necessarily preclude
him from a recovery against a party
guilty of negligence."
And see R.ilroad v. Slate, 36 Md. 364, where
BowtE, J., says, "Where a person
walking on a railroad track is run over
and killed by an engine belonging to a
railroad company, the company is responsible in damages for such killing,
though deceased was guilty of a want

Conn. 507 ; Daley v. Railroad, 26 Conn.
598; Bronson v. Santhbury, 37 Conn.
199; City v. Kirby, 8 Mlinn. 169 ; Boland v. Railroad, 36 Mo. 490 ; Whirley
v. Whittemore, I Head 620 ; Robinson
v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 ; Railroad v. Kelly,
7 Penna. St. 372 ; Ranch v. Lloyd, 31
Penna. St. 358 ; Railroad v. Spearen,
47 Penna. St. 300 ; Glassey v. Hestonville, 57 Penna. St. 172 ; Railroad v.
.M1ahony, 57 Penna. St. 187; Railroad
v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399 ; Gardner v.
Grace, 1 F. & F. 359.
That the negligence of the parent is
a bar to the recovery of the child, see
Singleton v. Railroad, 7 C. B. N. S.
287 ; Waitev. Railroad, 2B. & 0. 719 Mangan v. Atherton, Law Rep. 1 Ex.
239; Holly -. Gas Co., 8 Gray 123;
Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen 401 ; Vright
v. Railroad, 4 Allen 283; flartfield v.
Roper, 21 Wend. 615; Lehman v.
Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234; Mangan v.
Railroad, 36 Barb. 529 ; Bank v. Railroad, 49 Barb. 529; Flynn v. Hralton,
4 Daly 552; Ross v. Innis, 26 Ill. 259 ;
Chicago v. Starr, 42 Ill. 174 ; Railroad
v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513; Railroad v.
Hufinan, 28 Ind. 287 ; Railroad v.
Brown, 40 Ind. 535. But see Lynch v.
Smith, 104 Mass. 52; Railroad v. Bumstead, 48 I1. 221.
A very young child cannot be guilty
of contributory negligence. See Railroad v. James and Wife, 1 Weekly
Notes 68.
In Kay v. Railroad, 65
Penna. St. 277, AGxEw, C. J., says,
"Where the injury is caused by the
actual negligence of the company, the
incapacity of a child of this ago to
knj'v the danger and to avoid it shields
it from responsibility for its acts :"
Railroad v. Spearen, 11 Wright 304;
Smith v. O'Connor, 10 Wright 218.
Where the child is capable of exer-
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of ordinarv care and prndence in SO
walking on the track. provided it appear
that the accident would not have occurred if the agent of the railroad coinpatt had uited, in running the engine
which occaioined the killing, ordinary

prudence and care in giving reasonable
and usual signals of itsapproach, and
in keeping a reasonable lookout.'
See
also Gray v. Scott. 66 Penna. St. 345,
and Railr,,d v. Teabier, 33 Md. 532.
As to cattle injured while trespasshiuq,
see Railroad v. lJeUqr, .5 Denio 255
lWilds v. Raii-oad, 24 N. Y. 430 ; Railr,,,lv. Mrlure, 26 Ind. 370 ; Railroad
v. lIen/et, 33 Ind. 336 ; ll'dlians v.
Iailah,,d, 2 Mich. 259 ; Eatnes v. Railroad, 98 Ma. 560 ; Railroad v. Brayj ,
57 Il. 514 : Ruilmad v. Sndth, 22 Ohio
St. 227 ; liairorud v. Seirer, 60 Ill.
295.
(4.) U'.eof .lnbalsfearful of Loroinotire, T.-See Railroad v. Dunn, 61
Ston v. Hubbardston, 100
Mass. 50, Cntt
t, C.J. sai'l, " The
court are of the opinion that when a
horse, by reas-on of fright, disease or
viciousness, becomes actually uncontrollable, so that hi driver cannot stop him
or direct his; course, or exercise or regain control over his movements, and
in this condition comes upon a defect in
the highway, or upon a place which is
defective for want of a railing, by which
an injury is occasioned, the town is not
liable for the injury unless it appears
that it would have occurred if the horse
had not been so uncontrollable; but a
horse is not to be considered uncontrollable that merely shies or starts, or
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is momentarily not controlled by his
driver."
It is difficult to see how the court can
decide as to what amount of fearfulness
on the part of a horse, known to his
rider or driver, is sufficient to constitute
contributory negligence. The horse at
IL short distance fiom a locomotive may
be perfectly controllable, and when
brought in close proximity uninanagea-

ble.

Or lie may be manageable in the

absence of unexpected or repeated noises.
Is it not then for the jury to say in each
case, whether the knowledge of his
peculiarities Irv the plaintiff is sufficient
to bar his recovery against the railroad
company? See Dennott v. l|-llington,
15 Maine 27; 131iss
v. lVillraham, 8
Allen 564 ; Mfurdoch v. Wl'arwick, 4
Gray 178.
In Lower faciqungie Township v.
Merklhoff, 71 Peina. St. 280, the court
said, " It was not a defence to the township to show that by careful driving an
accident might have been avoided at
the place in question. That would fall
far short of what was the purpose of
the public highway. It inist be kept in
such repair that even skittish animals
may be employed without risk of danger
on it by reason of the condition of the
road."I
The rule laid down in some of the
caseb that on the aplroach of a train a
driver must not only stop, lint get out
and hold his horse's head, will seem to
those who are acquainted with the habits
of that animal a little singular.
SrDrE ]3I DDLE.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
IIENRIETTA BARNIIIZEL

ET A.L.
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A child adopted tinder the act regulating the adoption of heirs, approved March
2d 1835, ib entitled to inherit from the adopting parent as his heir in the degree of
a Child.
By the adoption, lie has the rights of a child of the adopting parent, without
being his child in fact. His identity is not changed.
.Under the law, a married man may adopt a child without his wife joining in the
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petition, and tie child may have an adopting father without an adopting mother,
with the right of inheritance from one and not from the other.
The rights of the lawful children of the adopting parent and the adopted child
are not changed or affected by tile adoption. No right is given them to inherit
from or through each other. They are not only not brothers and sisters, but they
have no rights as such.
By consenting to the adoption, the real mother consents that the adopting father
shall occupy the position of a father to the child, and that she will occupy that of a
mother. She does not surrender her maternal rights, or her rights of inheritance.
On the death of the adopting parent the adopted child inherits from him, and on
tile death of the child his real mother will inherit the property so'descending, to the
exclusion of tile children of the adopting parent.
Where an answer is filed containing a general denial, and also other paragraphs
setting up affirmative matter, which could be introduced under the general denial,
to which demurrers are filed and sustained, and the cause is then tried on the issues
of fact formed by the general denial, resulting in a finding and judgment for the
plaintiff; on appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties by agreement, in writing,
endorsed upon the transcript, may agree that the general denial shall be considered
withdrawn and the case decided upon the ruling of the court below, upon the demurrers to the paragraphs setting up affirmative matter. In such case tile Supreme
Court will decide the case as if the general denial had not been filed in the court
below.

APPEAL from Cass Circuit.
The facts sufficiently appear in the
opinion of the court, which was delivered by
OSBORN, J.-The appellee filed her complaint against the appellants, in which it is alleged that she is owner in fee simple of
certain described real estate in the city of Logansport ; that the
*appellants claim title to the same adverse to her, when in truth
and fact they have no right to the property, and, that their claim
creates a cloud upon her title. She asks judgment, settling and
confirming her title, and other relief.
The appellants are husband and wife. Henry H. Barnhizel,
the husband of Henrietta, filed a disclaimer. She filed an answer
of three paragraphs. The third is a general denial. Demurrers
for the want of sufficient facts were sustained to the first and
second, to which rulings exceptions were taken. The cause was
tried by the court, who found for the plaintiff, and rendered final
judgment on the finding against the defendant, Henrietta, as
prayed for in the complaint and for costs against her.
The only errors assigned, relate to the ruling of the court, in
sustaining the demurrers to the first and second paragraphs of the
answer. The parties have stipulated in writing entered upon the
transcript that the general denial filed by the appellant, Henrietta,
in the court below, shall be considered as withdrawn, and that the
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case shall be decided in this court, upon the ruling of the court
below upon the (lemurrers to the first and second paragraphs of
the answer of Mrs. Barnhizel, without any regard to the issue
formed by the general denial. Under that agreement we will
consider the questions arising under the first and second paragraphs of the answer as if the general denial had not been filed.
It will not be necessary to consider the two paragraphs of the
answer separately, as the same question arises in both. The facts
alleged are in substance : That Theodore S. Reuber and Henrietta, the appellant, were the only children of Jacob Reaber, deceased. Theodore S. intermarried with the appellee, and had issue
by her one child, Theodore, Jr., and (lied. After his death, Jacob
Reuber, on his petition, by virtue of and under the order of the'
Tippecanoe Circuit Court, adopted the child Tfieodore, Jr. ; that
the appellee, being then unmarried, appeared in open court, and
there consented to the adoption, and that the order of court might
be made. Afterwards, Jacob Reuber died intestate, being at the
time of his death the owner of the real estate in controversy,
together with other real estate in the county of Cass, which descended to the appellant, Henrietta, and Theodore, Jr., as his only
heirs. Partition was made of the real estate so descending by
the Cass Circuit Court, and the property in controversy was set
off to Theodore; after which he died intestate, unmarried and
without issue.
No question is made about the regularity or validity of the
order for the adoption of the child. We shall regard it as valid,
and that Theodore, Jr., became the adopted child of Jacob Reuber.
It is admitted that the child inherited the estate from his adopted
father and that he was seised of the land at his death. Mrs.
Barnhizel claims to inherit the property'as his sister, and that
when the appellee consented to the adoption, she thereby relinquished and gave up all her rights as mother, and that she cannot
inherit from him as such.
The rights of the parties depend upon the act regulating the
adoption of heirs, approved March 2d 1855, 2 G. & II. 341, 1 G.
& I. 801. That act provides that any person desirous of adopting any child, may file his petition therefor, in the Circuit Court
of the county where the child resides; and prescribes what the
petition shall state, and what steps shall be taken. The third
section is: "Such court, when satisfied that it will be for the
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interest of such child, shall make an order that such child shall
be adopted, and from and after the adoption of such child, it shall
take the name in which it is adopted, and be entitled to and
receive alr the rights and interest in the estate of such adopted
father or mother, by descent or otherwise, that such child would,
if the natural heir of such adopted father or mother." Section 4th
is as follows : "After the adoption of such child, such adopted father
or mother shall occupy the position towards such child that he or
she would if the natural father or mother, and be liable for the
maintenance, education and every other way responsible, as a
natural father or mother."
By the act of adoption, the child is entitled to inherit from his
adopted parent as his heir, in the degree of a child: Barnes v.
Allen, 25 Ind. 222-6. The act does not provide that he shall be
the child of the adopting parent, but he shall take the name, and
be entitled to take his property by descent or otherwise, the same
as he would if he was his child or natural heir, and the adopting
parent shall occupy the position towards the child of a father
or mother and be liable in every way as such. In Schafer v.
Bneu, 54 Penna. St. 304, it is said "The right to inherit from the
adopting parent, is made complete, but the identity of the child is
not changed, One adopted, has the rights of a child, without
being a child," and in Commonwealth v. Nancrede, 32 Penna. St.
(8 Casey 389), the same court says, " Giving an adopted son a
"right to inherit, does not make him a son in fact. And he is so
regarded in law, only to give the right to inherit." By the Act of
Pennsylvania of May 4th 1855 the child was to "1assume the name
of the adopting parent and have all the rights of a child and heir
of such adopting parent and be subject to the duties of such child:"
1 Brightly's Dig. 61 (10th ed.).
The law of Pennsylvania provides '"that if the adopting parent
shall have other children, the adopted shall share the inheritance
only as one of them in case of intestacy, and he, she or they, shall
respectively inherit from and through each other as if all had been
the lawful children of the same parent." This gives the adopted
child a cdpacity to inherit: Commonwealth v. Nancrede, 32 Penna.
St. 389. But not to take under a devise to the children of the
parent by adoption: Shafer v. -neu, 54 Penna. St. 304.
By the law of Massachusetts (General Statutes of Massachusetts
547), it is provided that the adopted child.shall be deemed, for the
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purpose of inheritance by the child and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and
children, the child of the parents by adoption the same as if lie had
been born in lawful wedlock, except that he shall not be capable
of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body or
bodies of the parents by adoption, nor property from the lineal or
collateral kindred of such parents by right of representation. It
also provides that the parents of 'uch child shall be deprived, by
the decree of adoption, of all legal rights as respects the child ;
and the child shall be freed from all obligations of maintenance
and obedience, as respects his parents. If the person asking to
adopt the child, have a husband or wife, the prayer of the petitioner shall not be granted unless both join in the petition. Our
statute ontains no such provision. In this state, the husband
may adopt a child without his wife joining in the petition. In such
case, the child might inherit from the adopting father, but not from
his wife. He would have an adopting father, but not an adopting
mother. Ile would have no right as her child. The Massachusetts statute contemplates the adoption by both husband and wife.
It speaks of " the parents by adoption," whilst ours refers to "such
adopting father or mother." By the Pennsylvania statute, the
adopted, and the other children of the adopting parent, shall
respectively inherit from and through each other, as if all were
lawful children of the same parent. No attempt is made to change
their identity. It is, that they shall inherit "as if" they were
children of the same parent. In other words, by that act, they
were to have the rights of brothers and gisters for certain purposes,
without being such in fact. Our statute contains no provisions on
the subject of the rights of the lawful and adopted children, as between themselves. Under it, their relation is not changed by the
act of adoption. No right is given to them to inherit from or
through each other. They are not only not brothers and sisters,
but they have no rights as such. Our conclusion is, that the
appellant, Mrs. Barnhisel, did not inherit from the boy Theodore,
Jr., as his sister.
The appellee consented to the adoption of the child by his grandfather, and that whatever changes such adoption should make in
the rights and duties of the parties to be affected, should be made,
and nothing more. She consented that the child's grandfather
should thereafter occupy the position of his father ; that the child
VOL. XXIII.-86
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should have the rights of a lawful child in his estate, and that she
would occupy the position of a mother, the father of the child being alive. There is nothing in the statute or in the nature of the
consent implying a consent to surrender her maternal rights; she
did not thereby cease to be his mother, or give up, or surrender
any rights of inheritance as such. It follows, that the land in
controversy descended to the appellee as the sole heir of decedent, sect. 4, 1 G. & H. 292, and that the court committed no error
in sustaining the demurrers to the first and second: paragraphs of
the answer.
The judgment is affirmed with costs.
The principal case is a valuable illustration of the strict construction that
ought to be applied in deciding the
questions that arc yet to arise under
And we shall
statutes of adoption.
offer a note upon the subject generally,
as mure useful than one confined to the
cast itself, which was undoubtedly
rightly decided.
Blackstone divides children into
"legitimate and spurious or bastards ;"
no legal relation of parent and child,
apart from the natural one, being known
to the common law. But in twentyfour of the United States, a relationship
-of parent and child by adoption has
been created by statute, and being statutory it differs as the statutes almost
necessarily do in the various states.
The amount of judicial construction to
aid us is small enough because the statutes are all of very recent date, not one
that we know of being twenty-five years
old, and perhaps also because adopting
parents generally have strong reasons
for dying testate, and disputes about the
inheritance being thus disposed of, there
is left for litigation only those parts
of the statute which concern the transfer
of sentiment, about which men are not
apt to quarrel.
But given the right to adopt at all, it
will be seen that there are some necessary and some natural limitations on
the legislation concerning it.

First : the adoption, except where it
consists merely in declaring the person
adopted an heir of the adopte', must be
founded on consent. All the statutes
require the written, and generally the
recorded consent of the adopting parent
or parents, and of the parents, parent,
guardian, next of kin, or next friend
of the minor appointed by the court, in
most states the consent of the minor if
over fourteen, and finally the consent of
the court.
Second : though one may consent to
make a child his own heir, lie cannot
make him the heir of other people ; so
that no adoption can have the effect of
disturbing previous and higher rights.
A man cannot by adoption introduce a
stranger into the right of succession to
property limited to him and the heirs
of his body. This is made an express
exception in the statutes of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Illinois, Wisconsin, Rhode Island and Oregon.
Nor can an adoption so disturb the
descent or distribution of property its
to enable an adopted child to inherit
from the lineal or collateral kindred
of his adopting parent by right of

representation. This and the former
case are both made, though we suppose
it was not necessary to do so, express
exceptions in the statutes of Massachusetts, Illinois, Rhode Island and Oregon: Moore v. Moore, 35 Vt. 98 -
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Schafer v. Eme,, 54 Peina. St. 304
Sewell v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262.
Third: a man cannot make the
adopted child so entirely his son and
heir as to relieve him from the tax on
collateral inheritances : Commonwealth
v. -Nancrede,32 Penna. St. 389 ; Thorp
v. Commonwealth, 58 Penna. St. 500.
These instances, except the last which
the legislature might waive, we should
consider necessary limitations upon the
enabling legislation on this subject.
Among the limitations one would
naturally expect to find would be that
the Icglature would not deprive the
kin of the adopted child of their right
to inherit from him, nor him of his
right to inherit from them ; and on the
other hand, that it would not confer on
him and the children of his adopting
parent the right to inherit from and
through each other as if they were
natural brothers and sisters.
We have thought it convenient to
classify the statutes of nineteen states
which were within our reach as follows
beginning with those in which adoption
is made a slight tic and proceeding as
they bring the relation nearer to that
of natural parent and child.
1. The natural parents surrender
nothing, ail the adoption simply consists in declaring the person adopted an
heir. Alabama (Code 1852, ? 2011).
Missouri (Vagner's Stat., vol. 1, ch.
28). Where the child is given tie additional right to claim support, maintenance and humane treatment, so that
the statute seemed to contemplate his
living with the adopting parents. Tennessee (Thompson & Steger Stat. 1871,
3643-3646), where, however, the
terms of the adoption may be set out in
time petition, and the rights of the adopted
chilt under the statute be restrained by
the decree : and Texas (Pascal's Ann.
Dig., Art. 30), where in case there is
any lawful issue living, the adopted
child cannot inherit more than one-

fourth of the estate of his adopting
parent which can be disposed of by will.
2. Tle natural parents or parent
transfer to the adopting all rights over
the chili, and the adopting parent or
parents assume all the duties. Maine
(Rev. Stat. 1857, p. 393), and California (I Civ. (ode, cl. 2, ? 228).
3. The two preceding eases combined,
Connecticut (Gen. Stat. Rev. 1866, p.
308), except as otherwise provided in
the agreement of adoption. Indiana
(Stat. Gavin & Iord, vol. 2, p. 341).
Kansas (Gen. Stat. 1868, ch. 67, P 6, 7.
4. The adopted child inherits as an
heir from the adopting parent, and the
adopting parent and iii heirs inherit
fcom the adopted child if lie dies without issue, all property that lie may have
derived from or through his adopting
parents. Illinois (Rev. Stat. 1874, p.
128), where the inheritance is also
allowed from the descendants of the
adopted child. Ohio (Rev. Stat., Swan
& Critchfield, vol. 1, p. 506).
5. The right of inheritance is made
mutual between the adopting parent
and the child. Iowa (Rev. 1860, p.
348). Massachusetts (I Suppl. Gen.
Stat. Mass., 2d ed. 906). Estate oj
Ellen Foley, I Philada. Weekly Notes,
301.
New Hampshire (Gen. Stat.
1867, ch. 169). Oregon (I)eady's
Gen. Laws 1845-1864, p. 673). Rhode
Island (Gem. Stat. 1872, ch. 150).
Wisconsin (Taylor's Laws 1871, vol.
I, p.785). We infer in thecascof New
Hampshire, Oregon and Rhode Island,
that the right of inheritance is as stated,
not from any words in the statutes expressly conferring the rights upon the
parents by adoption, but because of sections in each depriving the natural parents of all legal rights as respects the
child, one of which we take to be inheritance. But it might be argued that the
rights of which the natural parents are
hereby deprived are those which concern
the person of the child, as custody, set-
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vices, obedience; maintenance, &c., and

7. Tile terms of the adoption are

not the right of inheritance to his property, in which case these states should
be put in class third.
6. The adopted child and the children by blood, inherit from and through
each other as if they were brothers and
sisters by blood. Pennsylvania (Br.
Purd., p. 61). When, however, the

made a matter of agreement between
Nebraska (Gen. Stat.
the parties.
1873, p. 649-50).
8. The adopted child is made a son
or daughter in fact, which being an impossibility, is, we believe, attempted
nowhere: Shafer v. Eneu, 54 Penna.
St. 306.
H. G. W.

adopted child shares the inheritance
only in case of intestacy.

Supreme Court of Vrermont.
WHEELER v. WHEELER.
An advancement made by the intestate in due form may be legally cancelled by
him, by any unequivocal act carrying the same into execution, as by surrendering
or cancelling the evidence of such advancement.

THiS was an appeal from a decree of the Probate Court, charging
the appellant with an advancement towards his share in his father's
estate, which he claimed had been subsequently cancelled by his
father and could not therefore be reckoned as an advancement.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-The statute in relation to advancements (Gen. Stat.,
chap. 56, sects. 12, 13), declares what shall be evidence of an

advancement, and excludes all other evidence.
the settled doctrine in this state:

This has become

'reqwell v. Newell, 13 Vt. 33;

Brown v. Brown, 16 Vt. 197 ; Heirs of Adams v. Adams, 22
Vt. 51 ; Weat berizead et al. v. Field, 26 Vt. 665. Hence, with
us the law presumes, that property given by an intestate to an heir
is an absolute gift, unless the intention of the intestate to have it
charged to such heir as an advancement is evidenced in one of the
four ways named in the statute.
By the pleadings it is conceded that the intestate, February 12th

1848, delivered to the appellant, his son, $2000 by way of advancement towards the son's portion, and took from the son a receipt of

that date, in which the son acknowledged he had received of the intestate that sum towards his portion.

The $2000 thus became

properly evidenced as an advancement to be charged to the appellant in the distribution of the estate of his father. The issue made
by the pleadings, and tried by the court below, is, whether the
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father subseqluently delivered this receipt to the appellant and relinquibhed his right to have the $2000 charged to the appellant as
an advancement. This issue has been found by the jury in favor
of the appellant. The only questions reserved, are in regard to
the competency of the evidence on which the jury have found this
issue. All the appellant's evidence, on which this issue was established in his favor, was admitted against the exception of the
estate. The testimony of M2ary Wheeler in substance was, that
on a certain occasion the intestate surrendered the receipt, ald
ordered it burned, and it was burned. It is not claimed that she
was disqualified as a witness because she was the wife of the intestate at the time the transaction transpired to which she testified ;
nor, that her testimony did not tend to establish the issue made by
the pleadings. But it is claimed, that a surrender and cancellation
of the receipt, could not, if made as testified to, change the $2000
from an advancement to an absolute gift. In short, it is claimed
that the intestate could not, by any act short of a will executed
in due form, change what he had once delivered anld properly evidenced as an advancement to an absolute gift. In support of this,
it is argued, that when a man has once delivered property in such
a manner that it has became an advancement towards, or in satisfaction of the share which the receiver, as heir, would be entitled
to receive from the estate of the giver, the giver has parted with
all beneficial interest in the property, which he has or can have in
his lifetime ; that he cannot recall the, same from the heir, nor
charge the heir with the use of the property ; that the only right
remaining in the ancestor, is that of having the property, thus delivered, reckoned towards or in satisfaction of the heir's share in
the distribution of his-estate ; that to allow a man to surrender or
'cancel this right which pertains solely to the distribution of his
estate after his decease, by any other way than by a duly executed
will, is contrary to the policy and intent of the statute in regard
to the disposition of property by will.
This view at first appears to have some plausibility. It must
be conceded, that when a man delivers property in such a manner
that it becomes an advancement, he parts with all beneficial
interest in it, and only retains the right to have it reckoned in the
distribution of his estate towards, or in satisfaction of, that portion
of his estate which the heir would be entitled to. It is, also,
clearly against the statute in regard to the disposition of property
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by will, to allow a person to direct or control the distribution of
his estate in any other way than by a legally executed will. The
fallacy Of this view lies in treating property thus advanced as a
part of a mail's estate before his death. A man's estate is what
he leaves at his decease. During his life a man may dispose of
his property as he pleases. If he make an absolute gift, it will
very likely affect the amount which he will leave to constitute his
estate. Yet he has a right, while living, to deliver property as an
Absolute gift. By the delivery of property as an advancement,
and the surrender or cancellation of his right to have the property so delivered reckoned as an advancement, the owner accomplishes by two acts what he may accomplish by one act, in delivering the same property as an absolute gift. A s the whole necessarilv includes all its parts, the right to make a gift includes and
carries with it, the right to deliver property as an advancement,
and then to discharge the advancement. It can make no difference
in law, whether the giver accomplishes the same thing by two acts
or by one act. The result arrived at is the same. The two acts
no more contravene the policy of the law in regard to a man's
controlling the distribution of his property after his decease than
the one. A man who discharges an advancement in his lifetime,
affects, it may be, incidentally the distribution of the property he
may leave at his decease; but no more so, and in much the same
way, he affects it, when he makes an absolute gift. lie does not,
in such a case, direct or control the distribution of the property
wiehi lie leaves at his decease. This he can only do by a legally
executed will. He simply withdraws what he has once delivered
as an advancement, from being reckoned as a part of his estate
in the distribution thereof, the same as lie does when lie makes an
absolute gift. The right to have the property delivered, reckoned
as an advancement is his right, and not the right of those who
may prove to be his heirs. It is a right lie has retained to himself in the property delivered, as against the receiver of the property. Its surrender or cancellation may have the effect to lessen
the shares of the other heirs, but no more so than an absolute gift
of the same property. He may discharge this right in the same
way he may any other right which pertains to him personally.
The counsel for the estate has called our attention to no decided case which supports the view he urges upon us. Only two
cases have come under our notice, in which evidence has been
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received tending to show that the intestate had attempted to change
an advanct-net to a gift. In Clarke v. Jlrarren, 3 Conn. 355,
the intestate had chargcd to some of his children various articles
towards their respective portions. To the appellant the charge
was as follows: " Salisbury, January 1803, Nathaniel Clarke, my
son, Dr. The following articles, that may be charged are to go
towards his portion." *Then followed the charges. In the opposite column the intestate had written, " Salisbury, January 1823.
To the contrary by a gift, I balance my son, Nathaniel C. Clarke's
account," "N. CLARKE." Similar charges and entries were made
against his other children. The court say: "If the entries are
to receive their greatest effect they would have the effect only of
a gift by the father to these children : and in that view according
to the doctrine of this court in -Hatchet al. v. Straight, 3 Conn.
31, they must be deemed advancements." " Had the deceased
explicitly declared that they were not to be deemed advancements,
or part portion, the case might have been different. But his
entries are not to this effect. They seem to me merely to pursue
his intentions, expressed when he made the charges. They were
not to stand against the children as debts but as gifts, and gifts,
too, toward their portions." By this extract from the opinion it is
apparent that all gifts which, at common law, would be advancements, in that state, were presumed to be made as advancements,
if nothing more was shown, though the intention of the intestate
if made known to the contrary would control. The right of the
intestate to change advancements to gifts that could not be reckoned
as advancements was assumed and not raised or discussed in the
case. In Gilbert v. Wfritherel, 2 Sim. & Stu. 254, the fitther bad
advanced his son 10,0001., to go into business with, and taken his
note therefor. The son made payments on the note, became
involved in the business, and the father took the property and
assumed the debts. The son had continued in the business at the
request of his father against his own wishes. The son claimed
that the father was to surrender the note, if he did not get pay on
it out of the property which he passed over to him. Subsequently
the son had, in writing, stated and acknowledged that a certain
sum was due on the note to his father. The father, a few days
before his decease, when the son was not present, had the note
burned. The son claimed that this act extinguished it as a debt
and as an advancement. The court held, that, though the de-
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struction of the note by the father discharged the debt, yet under
the statute 22 & 23 Charles, relating to distribution of estates the
amount acknowledged due by the son remained an advatcement.

The only thing considered by the court was the effect of the destruction of the note, and not the right of the father to change an
advancement to a gift which could not be reckoned as an advancement. By the statutes under which these decisions were made, all

gifts by the father to a child, made towards the establishment of the
child in life, if nothing were shown to the contrary,' were presumed
to have been made as advances.
The foregoing opinion embraces a
question which seems not to have occurred in thc courts so often as we should
have expected. The case of Gilbert v.
IVitherel, 2 Sim. & Stu. 254, cited in the
opinion, is almost the only case we have
been able to find, whre any light is
thrown upon the question. And that
seems to have been ruled, mainly, upon
its particular facts and the intention
presumptively arising therefrom. But,
upon principle, we cannot comprehend
why there should be any doubt or difficulty in the question.
The advancement towards a distributive share in an intestate estate, or a
portioning off a child with the anticipation of the provisions for such child, in
the parent's will, are matters resting
wholly en pais, and cannot be regarded
as definitely settled, at the time the advancement or portion is made, but must
be subject to the control of the intestate,
or the testator, during his life. In the
case of an advancement, strictly speak-

ing, towards the distributive share in
the intestate's estate, its creation depends upon being evidenced in a particular manner, and its continuance depends upon the preservation of such
evidence, or, at all events, the voluntary
destruction of the evidence, by which
the advancement was created, must effectually destroy the effective continuance of the character of the advancement. As the intestate might originally
have made it a gift, so it is hut reasonable that lie should be able to cancel the
evidence by which it is made an advancement, either by removing it back,
or making it entirely a gift. The intestate might clearly cancel the advancement by making a new gift of equal
amount, without charging it as an advancement. And if he can thus indirectly cancel the advancement, there
can be no good reason why lie may not
do it by cancelling the evidence.
I. F. R.

U. S. -istrict Court, -Eastern District of Virginia.
IN RE CtIAMBERLAINES.
A consignment of goods under a special contract, in which the consignee gives
his acceptances for their value, payable partly at sight and partly at a future day,
and agrees to account for the whole price, to guarantee the sale'. and to receive a
commission of ten per cent. with Other stipulations, making him primarily liable
in re Arevill,
for the price of the goods, falls within the principle of Ex parte lle,
Law Rep. 4 Ch. App. 397, and is a consignment on sale, as 1distinguished from
a consignment on del credere guaranty.
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Though a conu.igor may re.,vrve a special property in goods consigned until
bills of exchange, drawn fir their price, are paid to the hill holders ; yet he cannot,
in a consignment on sale to a consignee, in which no such special property is reserved to protect bills drawn upnn the consignee for their price, reserve a special
property in notes and accounts, which the consignee may take for the goods, from
persons to whom the consignee may sell them, as against other creditors of the
consignee, who goes into bankruptcy.

Tills was a petition of B. C. Flannagan & Co. against the assignee of R. & 11. Chamberlaine, bankrupts, claiming a special
property in certain claims and accounts held by the assignce.
During the year 1878, B. C. Flannagan & Son, manufacturers,
of Charlottsville, Va., had dealings with R. & II. Chamberlaine,
commission merchants, of Norfolk, in a manure called the " Stonewall Fertilizer," under the following contract.
We propose to give you the entire agency for

December 6th 1874.
Stonewall Fertilizer," at Norfolk,

CC

and for the state of North Carolina, Raleigh excepted, on condition you push the
sales and have a proper man to look after it, and to allow you a commission of ten
per cent. for sales and guarantee.
We to draw on you at sight or short time for $30 a ton. The price to be sold
at is S65 in Baltimore. For balance, after paying $30, you to give your acceptances, say payable 1st December 1873 ; accounts to be rendered and settlements
after the selling season is over. No charge to be made for storage during the
season. Any guano left over and not sold is to be at the risk and on our account.
B. C. FLAXNAAN & SoN.
Respectfully,
P. S. We agree to furnish the guano delivered in Baltimore, 100 tons to be delivered in January 1873, and balance as ordered by you. We will ship in lots to
B. C. FL.AN .oxN & SoN.
any point you may dircct.
face of the above], Accepted December 6th 1872.
[Across tile

R. & II. CItAM-

DERLAINE.

On the 7th of January 1874, the following paper, was drawn
and signed.
Whereas R. & II. Chamberlaine have sold as agents for B. C. Flannagan &
Son, their Stonewall Guano, during the spring of 1873, according to contract between them, dated December 6th 1872, to which reference is hereby made ; they
having guaranteed said sales, and whereas, according to tileterms of said contract, the balance due from said Chamberlaine to said Flannagan was due and
payable December Ist1873, but owing to the failure of planters, to whom said
Chamberlaine sold, to comply with their terms of purchase, tfie said Clamnberlaine
has found it impossible to meet his said acceptances at maturity. and in consequence some of them have gone to protest. The said Flannagan in order to assist
the said Chamberlaine and give more time for his collection from llanters, has
this day taken from tie said Clhamberlaine, sundry acccptanccs.dated this day,
and maturing at an interval of ten tlays, running to 130 days inclusive, the procedls of which lie agrees and binds himself to use in payment of said protested acceptances. And as a further assistance to the said Chamberlaine, the said FlanVOL. XXIII.-87
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nagan agrees that if the said Chaimberlaine finds it impossible to meet the said
several acceptances, dated January 7th, at maturity, the said Flannagan will
further assist him by a renewal of same, and will not allow them to be protested.
The said.Chamberlaine for his part agrees and binds himself to use all due diligence in collecting from the parties to whom he sold as agent of the said Stonewall, and apply all proceeds from said parties strictly to the payment of the said
acceptances, dated January 7th. It being understood and agreed that such collections are held by him as agent only, and belong properly to the payment of
said acceptances aforesaid, he having sold as agent with the guarantee of payment.
B. C. FLANAGAN & SoN.
R. & I1. CHIAMB EItAINE.

The renewed acceptances were, ten of $1500 each, and one of
$1000. This latter acceptance and one for $1500, which, two
were the first to mature, were paid by the Chamberlaines. Those
still remaining unpaid are for the aggregate sum of $13,500.
The books of the Chainberlaines showed that the amount of their
actual indebtedness for the fertilizer, on the 27th April 1874,
was $13,143.59, exclusive of interest. They owed the Flannagans $368.09 on a cotton transaction, which had no connection
with the fertilizer. The amount of the outstanding accounts held
by the Ohamberlaines against planters for the fertilizer, on April
27th 1874, was $13,974.04. Fertilizer was shipped to the value

of $40,000.
The Flannagans brought an action at law on the acceptances in
the summer of 1874. The effect of their suit was such, that in
October 1874, the Ohamberlaines filed their petition in bankruptcy ;
and the suit stands suspended in the court of law. Under a consent order of this court in this case, the assignee in bankruptcy
was allowed to employ an agent for the collection of the debts
due by planters for the fertilizer, who has made some collections.
The unpaid claims against the planters for fertilizer will be of slow
collection, and will not realize, by a considerable per centage, the
amount due upon them.
The Flannagans now come in by petition, setting forth the two
contracts, and the condition of facts recited, and claiming not
only that the Chamberlaines are b6und for the amount of the
unpaid acceptances, on which they have sued, but that the notes, accounts and claims which the Chamberlaines held against planters for
the fertilizer, and which have pas~ed to the custody of the assignee
in bankruptc.y, shall be turned over to themselves for collection;
that when collected by themselves the amounts realized from these
claims shall be credited on the amounts due on the .Chamberlaines'
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acceptances; and that the debt of the Chamberlaines shall be
treated as a fiduciary debt, and dealt with as such in considering
the petition of the Ohamberlaines for discharge.
7V. iF. Ol, for petitioners.
John 8. Tucker, for assignee.
HUGHES, J.-The questions arising upon the two contracts are
chiefly important with reference to the petition of the bankrupts
for a discharge, though that petition is not yet before the court
for hearing.
The questions now to be decided are these, viz.
1st. Were the shipments of this fertilizer under the contract
of December 6th 1872, a mere consignment on a del credere guarantee, or were they on sale ?
2d. If a sale, did the shipments pass the whole property in the
fertilizer to the Chamberlaines, or was there a special property
reserved constituting in favor of the Flannagans a preferred claim
upon the proceeds of the fertilizer in the hands of the Chamberlaines ?
I. It is clear that the contract of December 6th 1872, did not
provide for consignments to the Chamberlaines as ordinary factors,
for sale on the usual commissions. Nor did it provide for consigninents upon the ordinary del credere commission of guaranty.
Had it done either of these things, the well-settled law, either of
simple or del credere agency, would have clearly determined the
rights and liabilities of the parties.
But these consignments were not made upon any sort of implied
contract. They were made upon an express contract, definite in
terms, written and mutually signed. We cannot, therefore, go
out of such a contract to the law of general consiginnents, or of
del eredere agencies, to ascertain the rights and liabilities arising
from their own stipulations of these parties. It is only when
there is no special contract that the general law of agency applies
between consignor and consignee; for it is always competent for
persons in this relation to contract according to their pleasure,
and thus vary or restrict, or enlarge, the general liabilities implied
by the law in absence of express contract: Story's Agency, § 334.
What were the provisions of the contract of December 6th
1872Y The Chamberlaines were to be responsible for all the
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sales of the fertilizer which they should make. They were to be
themselves primarily responsible. They were to discharge this
responsibility by acceptances payable at sight or on short time, as
to part, and at a future day as to the residue of the price of the
fertilizer. They were to have a commission of ten per cent., not
on. their own sales, but on the price of the article fixed in advance
by the consignors. They were, at the end of the season of business, to be credited with so much of the article as should then
remain on their hands. They were not to charge storage upon
the fertilizer, but if any of it remained on hand after the season
was over, they were then to be entitled to storage on such surplus.
In the contract, the terms "agency,"

"guarantee"

and "com-

mission" are used, implying that the parties considered that in
the transaction about to be made they should hold the relation to
each other of principal and agent.
The question is whether this contract constituted the Chamberlaines purchasers of the fertilizer, or merely agents for its sale on
a del credere guarantee. If the contract in its terms really constituted them purchasers, the use of words implying that they
were agents does not change the fact. " Persons may suppose
that their relationship is that of principal and agent, when in point
of law it is not :" -Exparte White, in re Nevill, Law Rep. 4 Ch.
App. 403. If the consignments were a sale, they were a final
sale as to the portion of the fertilizer which should be disposed of
during the season by the Chamberlaines ; and, as to the portion
remaining over at the end of the season, they were consignments
on "sale or return."
Upon the authority of the case of .Ex parte White, in re Nevill
above cited, and of section 215, Story's Agency, about to be referred to, I think the consignments were a sale, and not a shipment on a del credere guaranty. For, here, the obligations of the
Chamberlaines to pay for the fertilizer at a fixed price, and a fixed
time, was clearly established by the contract. They were primarily liable to the Flannagans for the fixed price, on their acceptances. They might sell to planters at a different price so far
as the obligation imposed by the contract was concerned. If the
planters were to be liable to the Flannagans at all, they were to
be so only secondarily. The Flannagans looked to the Chamberlaines only, and did not know the planters in the whole transaction.
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The now well-settled law of dclredereguaranty is that the factor
is not the primary debtor; that his engagement is merely to pay
the debt if it is not punctually paid by the person to whom be sells ;
that he stands more in the character of a surety than a debtor ;
and that lie is not liable to pay the debt until there has been default by the person who buys from him : Story's Agency, sect.
215, citing numerous English and American cases. Can it be
pretended that the stringent contract of December 6th left the
Chamberlaines in the secondary and optional relation to the Flannagans thus described, in respect to the article which they paid for
as it arrived with their acceptances ? Lord Justice MELLISI, in
Ex parte rhite, distinguishes between consignments on del credere
guaranty and those on sale, in the following explicit language:
"If the consignee is at liberty to sell at any price, and to receive
payment at any time lie likes, but is bound, if he sells the goods,
to pay the consignor for them at a fixed price and at a fixed time,
in my opinion, whatever the parties may think, their relation is
not that of principal and agent. The contracts of sale which [the
consignee makes with the persons who purchase from him] are not
contracts made on account of his principal, for lie is to pay a
price which may be different, and at a time which may be different, from those fixed by these contracts. He is not guaranteeing
the performance by the persons to whom lie sells, of their contract
with him, which is the proper business of a del credere agent; but
lie undertakes to pay a certain fixed price for the goods, at a
certain fixed time, to his principal, wholly independent of what
the contract may be which he makes with the persons to whom he
sells; and my opinion is that, in point of law, the alleged agent
in such a case is making, on his own account, a contract to purchase with his alleged principal, and is again reselling."
The Flannagans themselves treated the consignments as a sale
to the Cliamberlaines. After the acceptances, which they received under the contract of December 1872, had matured, and
been protested, they did not treat the Chamberlaines as their
debtors on open account, in the direct character of guarantors
of the sales which had been made to planters, but they treated
them as directly indebted on the acceptances which remained
unpaid. If the Chiamberlaines had been guarantors only, their
liability would not have been fixed until after proper means of
collecting the dues from planters had been exhausted. But the
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Flannagans declined to look to them in that character. They
treated them as already indebted, and dealt with the unpaid acceptances as tile evidence of their indebtedness.
Even supposing the Flannagans, by the terms of the contract
of December 1872, to have reserved for themselves the option of
treating the Chamberlaines either as agents or as purchasers at
pleasure, yet by the contract of January 1874, they availed themselves of this option, and did elect to treat them as purchasers;
for they accepted a novation of new acceptances in place of the
old ones for the whole value of the fertilizer not yet paid for.
It is true that the Flannagans did, to the latter contract providing for the novation, append a clause in the following words,
viz. "It being understood and agreed that such collections are
held by Chamberlaine as agent only, and belong properly to the
payment of said acceptances, having sold as agent with his guarantee of payment." But the most that can be claimed for this
stipulation in determining the question whether the consignment
was upon purchase or guarantee, is that it preserved to the Flannagans the option of electing afterwards, and a second time, whether
to rely upon the new acceptances for payment of the moneys due
them, or to resort to the notes and accounts due from the planters.
Supposing this right of choosing between these alternatives to
have been reserved, still, even in that case, the choice of the Flannagans, thus reserved, was made in the summer of 1874, when,
instead of going against the planters as first liable to them before
the Ohamberlaines were so as guarantors, they ignored the planters,
and brought suit against the Ohamberlaines on their acceptances.
If the Chamberlaines were liable as purchasers, then the Flanna.
gans had a right to sue them on their acceptances. If they were
not liable as purchasers, but only as guarantors, then they could
have been sued only after the remedy against the planters had been
exhausted, on open account.
Upon the whole case, therefore, I am of opinion that not only
did the contract of December, 1872, and the transactions of 1873
under it, make the Ohamberlaines purchasers instead of agents;
but the Flannagans, in the contract of January, 1874, and in the
suit brought in the summer of that year, themselves elected to treat
them as such, and committed themselves to that view of the contract.
It may be admitted that if the terms used in the writing of
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January 1874, had been employed in that of December 1872, it
would have been difficult to resist the conclusion that the consignments made under it were to the Chamberlaines as agents and not
as purchasers. But the second contract came too late to have any
effect upon the dealings. If the original paper of December 1872,
provided for a sale, and the transactions under it were those of
sale and purchase, then the contract of January 1874, made after
all the dealings were over, could not, by any language put into it,
change their character already fixed and'determined. Nor could
the agreement of the Chamberlaines in January 1874, to apply
their collections from the planters to the payment of the acceptances, change the previously fixed fact that they were purchasers,
if they really were so. That agreement was a merely voluntary
one to comply with an obligation of honor.
2d. ffaving concluded that the consignments of the Flannagans to
the Chamberlaines were made to the latter in the character of purchasers, and not of agents, it is next to be inquired whether the
sale was absolute or qualified. The principle of the leading case
of .Tenkis v. Brown, 14 Ad. & Ellis N. S. 496, is that when a
consignment is made, and bills of exchange are drawn for the value,
and bills of lading are sent to a third person to be delivered on
payment of tile bills of exchange, a sale is made, in which a general
property passes to the consignee, and a special property is reserved
by the consignor until the payment of the value. In other words,
a sale may take place on a consignment, although a special property
in the thing consigned be reserved'by the consignor.
In the leading case of the Bank of Ireland v. Perry, Law Rep.
7 Exchequer 14, it is decided, that where a consignor reserves a
special property in the goods consigned, that special property
follows the goods in favor of the holder of bills of exchange drawn
against them, when the consignee goes into bankruptcy or composition. The principle on which the bill holderis allowed the benefit of
this special property, as against other creditors of the insolvent, is
explained by Bispham, in his recent tract on Contracts In Rem, to
be that under the original consignment a jus in ren in the g9ods is
acquired by contract, as against the world, by the drawer of the
bills in favor of himself and the persons holding the bills from him;
and, that being a jus in rem against the world, this special property
follows the goods into the hands of assignees or trustees of an in-
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solvent eonsi gnee. If this principle be not yet conceded in courts
of law, it fully obtains in courts of equity, and must be applied ii
this court.
I think that the intention of the Flannagans to reserve a special
property in the proceeds of the fertilizer sold by the Chamberlaines
to planters is too plain to be denied. But was that intention
effected? The principle of the two cases just cited is that the
consignor may reserve a special property in the goods consigned,
for the protection of bills which he himself draws a:gainst the goods;
but they do not go so far as to bold that he may reserve a special
property in favor of himself in bills which his consignee may draw
upon soles of the goods which the consignee shall'make. Courts
of law have scarcely yet recognised the principle of the cases of
the Bank of Ireland v. Perry, above cited, and of Ex parte
praring, 19 Vesey 445, and courts of equity have not advanced
so far as to allow the original consignor to bind the proceeds of
goods after they have been received by the consignee and sold to
second consignees or purchasers. The law would have allowed the
Flannagans to bind the goods in favor of the holders of the drafts
drawn by themselves, but it would not follow the sale of the goods
by the Chamberlaines and bind in favor of the Flannagans the
notes and accounts taken by the Chamberlaines. If the Chamberlaines were now acting in their own right and were responsible, the
concluding clause of the contract of January 7th 1874 would bind
undoubtedly the notes and accounts due from the planters in favor
of the Flannagans as against the Chamberlaines. But the bankruptcy of the latter has thrown these notes and accounts into the
hands of their assignee, subject to the rights of other creditors
and it would be carrying the doctrine of jus in ren too far to hold
that the Flannagans have a special property in those notes and
accounts, as against general creditors. I am bound to decide,
therefore, that the Fltnnagans have no special property in the
notes and accounts due from planters for the fertilizer sold by the
Ohamberlaines, and that these ciwses in action are part of the
genera assets in this cause.

NEBEICER v. COCHRAN.

Circuit Court of Indiana, Twenty-first Circuit.
NEBEKER

ET AL. v.

COCHRAN

ET AL.

The maker of a negotiable note who executes it in such form as to admit of
fraudulncit alteration with case and without leaving any trace of the fraud by
which a purehaser can be put on his guard, is cstopped by his negligence from
setting up the alteration against a bond .fide holder for value.

Tuis was an action upon a negotiable note. Cochran, the
maker, answered that when the note was executed by him there
was attached to it, as part of it, a condition to the effect that it
was not to be paid until the profits arising from the sales, by him,
of "Drake's horse hay-fork and carrier," should equal the amount
of the note; and that since the delivery of the note and without
his consent the condition had been taken from it.
The plaintiffs replied that they were purchasers for value without
notice of the alteration ; and that when they purchased the note,
it was as it now is, and without any sign or mark indicating alteration ; that it was made upon a blank of the usual form, surrounded
by a double line border, with from one-eighth to one-quarter of
an inch of blank space outside the border; and that if any condition was ever attached it was outside the border, and so attached
that it could be easily removed without leaving any trace or mark
of the alteration. To this reply the defendant demurred on the
ground thatit did not contain sufficient facts, &c.
DAVIDSON, J.-The question is this: will the maker of a note,
negotiable by the law merchant, who executes it in such form as
to admit of alteration with case, and without leaving any trace or
mark by which the alteration can be detected, or a purchaser
put upon his guard, be estopped, if such alteration is made, from
setting it up as a defence, in a suit by a bond fide bolder for
value? If this question is to be answer.ed in the negative, the
character of negotiable paper will be most seriously damaged. To
permit such a defence under such circumstances would be to lift
the burden from the negligent maker and place it upon the innocent holder; to discharge him whose confidence, rashly bestowed,
has been betrayed-whose act contributed to the fraud-and
make him suffer " who reposes no confidence, but acts upon what
the law admits is primd facie evidence." If this reply is not good,
the makers of negotiable notes will be exempted from any duty of
VOL. XXIII.-88
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care whatever, and under no circumstances can anybody suffer but
the innocent holder.
In Chapman v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137 and Nebeker et al. v. Cutsinger, ,decided by the Supreme Oourt of Indiana (48 Indiana
436), the maker of this class of paper, who could read, 'but
who had signed the note without reading it, and upon the representation of the 1iayce that it was an order only that he was signing, was held liable to a bondfide endorsee for value. In the cases
of Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234; Bainbolt v. Eddy, 34 Iowa
440, and Garrardv. Hadden, 67 Penna. St. 82, the notes in suit
had been materially altered by unauthorized additions in filling
blanks left by. the makers, and the makers were h6ld to be estopped from setting up the defence to the suits of endorsees for value
and without notice of the fraud. In each of the cases cited the
maker's liability was placed upon the ground of negligence. The
negligence of the maker in signing a note with the condition so
attached that it may be removed without leaving any mark to
attract attention or excite suspicion, will more readily admit of
fraudulent practices, than his negligence in signing the note without reading it, or without drawing his pen through the blanks in it.
The risk of detection would be greater to him who would undertake to falsely read an instrument to another who was to sign it,
than to him who removed a condition which had been so attached
as to make its removal, without leaving any trace or sign, convenient and easy. No greater premium could be offered to negligence than to hold, in such a case, that the maker could successfully
plead the alteration against a bond fide holder for value. If a
note is put into circulation in such form that a material part of it
may be detached, leaving a perfect instrument, without any sign
of alteration, the act is not distinguishable from that of the execution of a note in such form as to admit of an addition by which its
.meaning is changed. If it is the duty of the maker of negotiable
paper to execute it in such form as will not readily admit of alteration by the addition of words, increasing his liability, it is equally
his duty to see that it is not executed in such form as will, with
facility, admit of alteration by taking words therefrom, whereby
the same effect is produced. The cases cited, therefore, support
the reply in this case. The case-of Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 Penna.
St. 188, is very much like this, and in that ease the court says:
"It is the duty of the maker of a note to guard, not only himself,

